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1 By  the  time  the  Greek War  of  Independence  had  reached  its  final  stages  in 1829,
negotiations for the demarcation of the new state’s borders had not yet been completed.
A long‑drawn‑out diplomatic process carried on until 1832. During a period of almost
three years there was neither a formal frontier line nor de jure independence for Greece,
while the Ottoman Empire was engaged in fierce domestic wars with Albanians, Bosnians
and Egyptians.1 The future of comparatively extensive provinces in Sterea Hellas (the
Hellenic terra firma, also known in Greek as Roumeli)2 was debated, and on paper changed
ownership  three  times  in  a  space  of  two years.3 Half  of  the  provinces  that  would
eventually be included in the Greek state constituted a disputed borderland. Following a
disastrous decade of war, local Greek and Albanian military élites found themselves in an
awkward position. The ceasefire of September 1829 and the indiscernible yet impending
frontiers were restricting their options and threatened their welfare in unexpected ways.
They could not and did not stay idle. They exploited tradition and modernity, most of all
their rich experience in political manoeuvring, in order to bargain for a better position
for  themselves  in  the  coming  new  era.  Their  choices  varied,  yet  their  method  was
uniform. It was the only method they knew in pursuing their cause: to bargain tough
before  compromising,  even  if  the  given  choice  involved  extensive  civil  strife.  Their
adversaries,  a  crumbling  Empire  and  the  soon‑to‑be  Greek  nation‑state,  were
unpredictable  in  their  responses.  Closely  monitored  by  the  European  powers,  the
Grand Vizier  Mehmed Reşid and  Governor  Ioannis Kapodistrias  had  to  show
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determination and improvisation, in order to gain the necessary prestige and win back
the disputed territories. The purpose of this paper is to analyse and explain the politics of
survival adopted by the military élites of the new frontiers, the interaction between the
two centres, the Sublime Porte and Kapodistrias, and their respective borderlands, in the
absence of concrete territories and in the presence of a trans‑ethnic network of delicate
Greek‑Albanian relations.
 
During the War of Independence: Albanians between
Greeks and Turks
2 The last battle of the War of Independence was fought on September 12, 1829 at Petra in
Boeotia, close to the battlefield of Aliartos, where the Thebans had defeated the Spartans
in 395 BC.  The  Greek  revolutionary  forces  were  headed  by  Field Marshal
Dimitrios Ypsilantis, a former officer of the Imperial Russian Army, and brother of Prince
Alexandros Ypsilantis.  The  latter  had  kicked  off  Greek  revolutionary  activities
in February 1821,  when  he  crossed  the  Prut River  into  the  Ottoman  controlled
Danubian Principalities and issued a proclamation urging Hellenes to rise for “faith and
country.” By the time of Dimitrios’ victory in 1829, Alexander had already died in poverty
in Vienna (Jan. 1828), having spent seven years in close confinement by the Austrians.
The youngest brother completed the task the eldest had set, and made his martyrdom
worthwhile. The symbolism was great and outlived the details of the Petra battle.4 Few
Greeks today know who were in charge of the defeated Ottoman forces and why they
surrendered. Had they known, they would have acknowledged an additional symbolism,
or perhaps a historical irony.
3 One of the two compromised Ottoman leaders, on the head of a few hundreds Albanians,
was a Tosk in his early twenties, A[r]slan Bey Puzzi, also called Aslan Μühürdar, i.e. the
seal‑keeper.  It  seems  he  was  the  son  of  Ali Pasha’s  trusted  seal‑keeper
Mehmed Bey Karamurat, who allegedly had inherited a quarter of his master’s legendary
treasure.5 After the battle of Petra, Aslan Bey and his co‑leader Osman Agha, were quick
to strike a deal with Ypsilantis, allowing them a safe passage to the north in exchange of
some fortified positions which would secure Greek control up to Spercheios River. This
compromise was crucial for diplomacy. The Greeks were anxious to secure a firm grip on
Roumeli,  yet  unaware  that  nine days  before,  in Adrianople,  the  Russians  had already
imposed on the defeated Ottomans the Volos‑Amvrakikos line as the future frontier of
Greece.6 The irony was that in the early stages of the Greek Revolution, in the summer
of 1821, Dimitrios Ypsilantis had invited the “brave Tosks” to side with the Greeks, then
at war with Ali Pasha.7 Eight years on, the Tosks were still on the side of the Ottomans,
defending the interests of the Ottoman government up to the very last battle. Apparently,
the Greek appeal had been in vain.
4 This narrative is somehow misleading, for some interesting episodes are missing. The
Tosks are one of the two Albanian population groups, which, at the time, resided south of
the Scubi River,  as  far  south as the Gulf  of  Amvrakikos.  Compared to their  northern
neighbours, the warlike, arrogant, and rough Suni Muslim Geghs, Tosks, especially the
lowland Cham tribes, with their fair complexion, were considered by nineteenth‑century
observers as more friendly and hospitable, yet poor and filthy. They were the followers of
the tolerant to the Christian faith Bektashi order and were in close social and economic
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contact with the Greeks of Southern Albania and Epirus. Greeks thought of the Geghs, or
“Skodrins,” as a different tribe with a distinctive ethos.8 British diplomats classified them
as  a  different  nation,  whatever  this  term  meant  in  their  early  nineteenth‑century
vocabulary.9 This did not imply that Tosks were less involved in eighteenth‑century raids
against their Christian neighbours,  especially against the warlike and hard to subdue
Souliots. However, within the court and the military apparatus of Ali Pasha Tepelenli, the
notorious semi‑independent Albanian ruler, a trilingual élite, of Tosk and Greek warlords,
armatoles, pass‑keepers, and army commanders, came into close contact. Bonds of trust
and blood were formed between them but should not be overestimated. As the war the
Porte had launched against Ali and the Greek insurgents overlapped, for a brief period of
time, in 1820-1821 Tosk and Greek interests converged. The Souliots joined first on the
side  of  their  former  pursuer  to  regain  their  homeland.  It  was  in  this  context  that
Dimitrios Ypsilantis  encouraged the Tosks to fight together with the Greeks for their
freedom against their “tyrant”, the Sultan, and flattered them as descendents or “our
ancestors” (i.e. the ancient Greeks), not related to the “pusillanimous Orientals and the
infidel Skythians”. This coalition culminated into a joint and almost successful operation
against numerous Ottoman forces holding the town of Arta by the armatoles of Aetolia and
Akarnania, the Souliots and some Tosk leaders. The venture was short‑lived. Before the
end of 1821, it became clear to the Tosks that the Greeks were fighting for a different
cause, for another faith, not for Ali Pasha but against Islam. Apparently, they had been
deceived  and  had  disgraced  themselves  for  an  unjust  reason.  They  reinstated  their
allegiance to the Sultan, yet they treasured their military word of honour and took care
that the Souliots drift away smoothly and safely.10 A few months earlier, in September,
General Theodoros Kolokotronis had also taken all the necessary precautions to secure a
safe passage out of the Peloponnese for the Albanians of Tripolitsa, on the eve of the
notorious massacre he carried out.11 The following year (1822) the same Greek officer
tried to win over the Albanians by exploiting the legacy of Ali Pasha, but his letter was
intercepted; not that his appeal stood any chance.12 By that time, the ruler of Epirus was
dead, while operations against the Greeks, which included extensive plundering and slave
trading, kept Tosks and Geghs alike extremely busy and content. On their head were some
of Ali’s best warlords and adamant supporters, who had turned into a true menace for the
insurgent  Greeks.  Yet,  incidents  of  personal  contact  and  mutual  assistance  between
Greeks and Albanians did not cease throughout the war.
5 Albanian active participation did not eliminate Ottoman mistrust, which went back to at
least the late eighteenth century, long before Ali had built his semi‑autonomous state.13
The  Tosks  in  particular,  the backbone  of  Ali’s  state  mechanism,  were  suspected  of
disloyalty to the Sultan and luck of true religious fervour for Islam. Even the famous
general  Omer Vrioni,  with  a  distinguished  record  in  the  battles against  the  British
in Egypt (1807), was not an exception. He had served Ali, but cut himself a deal with the
Porte and abandoned his master just in time to fight against him. In Ottoman reports, it
was regularly repeated that the Albanians’ motive was exclusively money. They were not
fighting for their Sultan. They were true mercenaries and, in need of capital, they would
sell their services to the highest bidder, even if he was not a Muslim. Numerous instances
of  refusing to join in the war against  infidels  without advance payment and various
incriminating letters intercepted from time to time that testified to their contacts with
the Greek revolutionary captains proved their perfidious nature. Mehmed Reşid Pasha,
also known as Kütahı, then commander‑in‑chief (serasker) of the Ottoman forces that led
the two sieges of Missolonghi was perhaps their most severe critic. Of Georgian origin and
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a faithful slave of the Porte since childhood (kapikulu), he was unable to comprehend the
Albanians’ predilection to barter. Rumours run that he had been deliberately deceived by
Omer Vrioni in 1822 when the latter, contrary to his view, tried to take Missolonghi by
negotiations instead of an assault. Meanwhile the Greeks were reinforced and had been
made aware of his plans.14
6 By  the  time  Aslan Bey  and  Osman Agha  faced  Ypsilantis  at Petra,  in September 1829,
Mehmed Reşid Pasha had accumulated many additional  reasons to be angry with the
Albanians.  The tide was clearly against  the Ottoman Empire since 1827.  In April 1827,
Kapodistrias was instated as the governor of Greece; in July, European intervention on the
Greek side was decided in London, and in October, it came into being at the naval battle of
Navarino. General Richard Church, the Philhellene Chief‑Commander of the Greek Army,
had already begun to recapture Roumeli.15 Then the Russo‑Turkish War that broke out in
April 1828 and the Russian advance during the following summer made crystal clear that
Greek independence was forthcoming and war activities were inevitably coming to an
end. Defeated and broken the Empire was badly in need of manpower but could not afford
it. The unpaid Albanians in Ibrahim Pasha’s Egyptian army in the Peloponnese began to
desert and negotiated with the Greeks the very castles they were supposed to guard.16
Mustafa Pasha Busatli  of  Skodra  asked  for  territorial  concessions  to move  his  Geghs
against  the  Russians.  The Tosk beys  stubbornly  rejected Kütahı’s pleas  for  assistance
while he was trying to hold back the Greek invasion deep into the mountains of Western
Roumeli. Instead, they had started pourparlers with the Greeks. Some were ready to trade
their keeps and lands for a huge amount of cash. Other beys set off against the Greeks
only when the Serasker moved to the Balkan front in March 1829; but it was too late.17 The
towns of Roumeli were turning Greek one after the other, without any serious resistance
by their Albanian guards. Aslan Bey’s sudden and successful intrusion to the south, as far
as the still Ottoman-held Athens, was not destined to change the outcome of the war. His
compromise at Petra was almost inevitable. Busatli’s forces had also retreated from the
Bulgarian  front  against  the  wish  of  the  Ottoman  generals.18 The  provision  for  a
Greek‑Ottoman boundary running between the gulfs of Volos and Amvrakikos, which was
decided at Adrianople, was the fatal blow. Roumeli was lost for the Empire, seemingly for
good, and Albanians had contributed significantly to that end, although this region was of
vital economic interest for them. How come?
7 In  the  summer of 1826,  it  became  clear  in  the  bloodiest  way  that  the  Porte  was
determined to form a regular army. This was a severe blow not only for the Janissaries
but also for the Albanians, whose social structure depended heavily on the mercenary
system.  The  prestige  of  the  clan  leaders  was  related  to  the  number  of  their  armed
followers and their economic welfare to the advance payment forwarded to them by the
Porte in order to recruit and sustain soldiery. Only a portion of this capital they gave cash
to their men; the rest was borrowed with interest until the campaign was over and the
accounts  settled.  As  a  rule  recruits  were  less  than  those  promised,  thus  permitting
additional profit for contractors. Ransom, income generated from slave trade and other
spoils, were extras, which warlords and their followers counted upon to make ends meet,
especially if advances were delayed. As the Greek war was ending, this profitable system
was  also  coming  to  an  end.  By  that  time,  the  Porte  had  already  contracted  a  huge
domestic debt of millions to Albanian veterans, which it was unable to cover.19 Breaking
up  was  not  a  priority  for  the  prudent  leaders.  They  had  to  buy  time.  In 1828,
Mehmed Reşid managed to regain the post of vali in Ioannina and to oust Omer Vrioni. A
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compromise was reached at the highest level in Constantinople to appease the Albanians.
Indirectly it prolonged the mercenary system in exchange for delayed payments.20 The
Serasker was still supported by a few beys, not all of them very influential. Veli Bey Yadji
and  his  brother  Muslim,  Bekir Agha  of  Papouli,  Suleiman Bey  of  Konitsa  and  the
respectable Tahir Abazi, the ablest veteran chief of Ali Pasha, were among them.21 Yet,
these beys and their local commanders could not guarantee the discipline of the unpaid
troops.  The latter  either  levied onerous  irregular  taxes  on Christians  to  compensate
themselves  or  deserted  their  posts  to  avoid  engagement  with  the  Greeks,  then
approaching the gulf of Amvrakikos and moving to the mountainous region of Agrafa.
Veli Bey’s own forces were insufficient to strike back.22
8 All this did not imply that Albanian power had evaporated or that their wealth had been
entirely exhausted. It was there, but it was outside Kütahı’s reach, in the hands of an
informal anti‑Ottoman confederacy headed by the wealthy Iliaz Bey Ziliftar Poda, once
the right hand (sword‑bearer) of Ali Pasha, an expert in conspiracies and politics and less
so in military affairs. He had deserted and had been denounced by the Porte in 1823.23 On
his side stood Sahin Bey of Delvino and Ismail Bey of Vlora, scion of an illustrious family.24
The most efficient military commanders of the confederacy were the aforementioned
Aslan Bey Puzzi and his brothers Ragib and Kaplan. It could be argued that these men
were  following  roughly  on  the  tracks  of  Ali Pasha.  Poda  was  steadily  encouraging  a
rapprochement with the Roumeliot chieftains, his old acquaintances from the court of
Ali;  Sahin and Ismail  were in contact with Kapodistrias’s elder brother,  Viaros,  in an
attempt  to  rekindle  Albanian‑Greek  relations  and  possibly  to  co‑ordinate  military
operations.25 However, they were not looking for a formal and binding alliance with the
rebels or desired to live under Christian rule,  as Mehmed Reşid suspected.  In a letter
addressed to other beys,  Ismail Vliora stated that  the Albanians would deal  with the
Greeks once they had protected their fatherland (vatan)  and put their own miserable
house  in  order.  This  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  call  for  Albanian  national
independence. What they really wanted was to have a word in Ottoman politics and to
retain their military hegemony. As forced conscription to the regular army (nizam) was an
imminent  danger,  Vliora  urged  them  to  stand  up  against  the  Serasker,  who  was
determined to subdue Albania. Vliora was not an easy prey for Kütahı but eventually he
was murdered in January 1829, following an impressive and cunning conspiracy.26 Shortly
afterwards Mehmed Reşid  was  appointed Grand Vizier  and left  for  the Russian front.
Aslan Bey, Ziliftar Poda and their followers were at large, trying to make the most out of
this period of anarchy; at times, they were active against the Greeks but steadily refused
to support the Serasker’s plans. As rumours about the collapse of the front in Bulgaria
spread, this opportunistic attitude was shared by a growing number of Albanian beys.
There was a widespread impression of a forthcoming and generalised revolution that
expected its natural leader to break out. It was common knowledge that this was the
mission for  Mustafa Pasha Busatli  of  Skodra.  No one else  could equal  his  wealth and
power or his political connections in the Balkans and Egypt.27
9 Judging  the  policy  of  the  anti‑Ottoman  Albanian  party  is  impossible  without  a  fair
knowledge of the Greek camp in Roumeli. After the fall of Missolonghi (April 1826), the
Greek  struggle  entered  a  most  critical  stage.  When  the  Acropolis  in  Athens  fell
in late May 1827, few people believed that Greece had a chance to become a sovereign
state and even less, that Roumeli would be part of it. The captains of the armatoles had to
decide  their  future  with  caution.  Their  status  as  men  of  war  depended  on  specific
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provinces, which their ancestors and they had been policing for generations, some times
for centuries, under the auspices of the Porte and most lately by the grace and direct
control of Ali Pasha. Within these provinces laid the lands and pastures they controlled
and other sources of income, like tax‑farming, which secured their own welfare and the
maintenance of their armed followers (palikaria). A network based on intermarriage and
on various other forms of social bonding protected their rights from usurpation. Alliances
with the Albanian clans were also indispensible for survival at times of war and peace.
Without allegiance to Ali Pasha, any warlord and his clan were doomed. The well‑known
sufferings  of  the  Souliot  clans  bear  witness  to  the  misfortunes  of  neutrality.  After
Ali’s death, however, the practice of switching camps was in full swing.28 In 1826‑27, the
restoration of Ottoman control in Sterea Hellas made certain that the armatole captains
would  have  to  take  care  of  their  own,  of  their  followers  and  of  their  provinces.
Capitulation, genuine or invented, was a traditional practice, a sign of wisdom rather
than of cowardice. Of course, in the days of national revolution, capitulation could be and
indeed was interpreted as treason; yet to several captains it looked a good idea at the
time.29
10 But then, in a few months time, the tide of war changed against the Ottomans and the
successful  expedition  of  Church  in  western Roumeli,  encouraged  some  of  them  to
reconsider. They did not disengage from the Ottoman camp all at the same pace nor with
the same conviction. They had to play safe since there was no reassurance about the
future frontier of Greece before the Treaty of Adrianople. Loyalty to the Porte could be
used as advantage to resume their services. Their future prospect in the Greek camp was
unclear, as Governor Kapodistrias was determined to turn the revolutionary forces into a
regular army. ‘Regularity’ implied limited placements for officers,  especially for high-
ranking,  the  formation  of  units  with  registered  soldiers,  and  a  centrally  controlled
accounting system that would rationalize the flow of salaries. None of these measures was
tempting but several chieftains gave it a try, motivated more by the favourable frontier
provisions of the third London Protocol (March 1829) and less so by bribes in cash. Their
contribution was crucial for tipping the balance of power as the Ottoman side was falling
apart.  It  was a matter of impression first of all.  It  was common knowledge that they
wouldn’t  have  changed  sides  unless  they  were  convinced  that  the  insurgents  would
prevail.  The  armatoles’  active  but  risky  participation  was  expected  to  secure  more
territories for Greece. But they were useful in an additional way. They easily convinced
their Albanian former comrades to quit unpaid resistance in exchange for a safe passage
out  of  the  besieged  strongholds,  which  they  personally  guaranteed  as  trusted
go‑in‑betweens. It was in this context of unofficial compromise and military disarray that
the Albanian anti‑Ottoman confederacy sought, throughout 1829, to recruit Greek allies
against the Porte. As they were drifting apart from the Sultan, they assumed that the
Greeks, then being on a weak offensive, had all the necessary motivation, as a state in the
making  and  as  individual  marauders,  to  secure  solid  support  for  another  round  of
warfare, expected to facilitate a common yet extremely ill‑defined cause. They were only
partly correct in thinking so.30
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The treaty of Adrianople, the new frontier and the
former armatoles
11 The Treaty of Adrianople was officially announced in Ioannina only in late January 1830.
A few days later with the fourth Protocol of London, the Greece of Adrianople was shrunk
in exchange of independence free of tribute. The new frontier would follow the flow of
Spercheios and Acheloos, thus leaving to the Porte a considerable part of central Roumeli,
including  some  places  of  strategic  importance,  and  most  of  western Roumeli,  i.e.
Northern Aetolia and Akarnania.  This sequence of  diplomatic events over a period of
more  than  six  months  (September 1829‑May 1830)  and  the  rumours  preceding  and
following it  fed both Greek and Albanian unrest,  which soon turned into anger  and
despair over the loss of territory. Evidently, Church’s last campaign had been in vain.
Subsequently he resigned his post, blamed Kapodistrias for the compromise, initiated a
movement of protest among the warlords of Rumeli and, in May 1830, published a report
entitled Observations on an Eligible Line of Frontier for Greece as an Independent State. Church
placed much emphasis on the unjust disappointment of the brave Roumeliot veterans,
who had to retreat and surrender their land to the defeated Albanians.31 As prospects
changed,  keeping the veteran captains  who had sided with Church on a  short  leash
became  a  complicated  issue.  In  late 1829,  as  warfare  had  officially  ceased,
Augustinos Kapodistrias,  the  Governor’s  younger  brother,  took  over  the  task  to
re‑organise the Greek regular army. His plan was flexible enough to provide honorary
and other policing positions in light units for the surplus of chieftains and to appease
even those who had most recently been attracted to the Greek cause. Encouragement
implied even paying a few reluctant captains.32
12 Yet, it was impossible to satisfy them all. When the first regular light battalions were
formed, dissatisfied, and redundant warriors and chieftains sought alternative careers
with the Ottoman Empire. As the armatolik system was reinstated everywhere, reclaiming
their family rights and offices in their distant homelands, in Thessaly and Macedonia, was
not meaningless. The same was true for the famous Agrafa armatolik, for the time being a
no‑men’s land, partly or wholly outside the Greek frontier. One of the local chieftains,
Sotiris Stratos, although despised by the locals, was tolerated and given offices by both
Greek  and Ottoman authorities,  for  keeping  his  province  neutral.33 The  really  tough
question, however, was faced by the former armatoles of those regions that Greece was
expected to hand over to the Porte following the last protocol. They were still in control
of the tax‑framing system and had managed to embezzle part of the tributes, yet not
without  disputes  with  the  central  government.  These  men  as  a  rule  belonged  to
Kapodistrias’ opposition, led by Ioannis Kolettis, a former doctor in the court of Ali Pasha
of Vlach origin and a well‑known expert in political intrigues.34 For the time being their
mentor was inactive, hoping for an appropriate office by the Governor. Should they also
stay  idle?  Should  they  challenge  diplomacy  with  arms  and  join  the  rebel  forces  of
Ziliftar Poda  or  renew  their  allegiance  to  the  Sultan  in  exchange  for  profits  that
Kapodistrias was unable or unwilling to cede?
13 The Governor knew these veterans could not be trusted. His special  commissioner to
western Greece,  the  educated  and  widely‑travelled  Konstantinos Rados,  and  the
chief commander  of  the  army  units  in  the  same  region  since September 1829,  the
Neapolitan experienced officer Vincenzo Pisa, were closely monitoring the veterans and
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reporting on their whereabouts. Kapodistrias was anxious to curtail any communication
between the Greek captains and Mehmed Reşid, which could have been interpreted as
evidence of loyalty to the Porte and of his own weakness to inspire order. What he was
afraid of ‑ in addition to local conspiracies and mutinies‑ was Ottoman retaliation in case
these captains were involved in Albanian uprisings. A successful Ottoman invasion would
eliminate any hope of altering the course of diplomacy in favour of Greece and would
render the delivery of western Roumeli as well as his own demise inescapable.
14 On  the  other  side,  the  Grand Vizier,  his  son  Emin Bey,  stationed  in  Ioannina
since April 1830,  Mahmud Hamdi Pasha  of  Larissa,  an  efficient  Circassian  loyal  to
Mehmed Reşid,  and Veli Bey Yatzi  were all  working for exactly the opposite cause as
firmly  as  Kapodistrias.  In  fact,  the  policy  of  shaking  off  Greek  political  influence  in
Roumeli had begun much earlier, but was renewed and reshaped after the Russo‑Turkish
War and the fourth Protocol. In addition to re‑allying with the armatoles, the Porte sought
to restore law and order  in its  western provinces.  Measures  regulating taxation and
tributes were issued. Relevant circulars were dispatched to all provinces, assuring the
Sultan’s subjects that his primary concern would be to alleviate the distress of the poor
and to treat the Christians as equals. Flattering and threatening letters in equal measure
were delivered to persons of  influence.  False rumours were disseminated to increase
pressure. Declarations of loyalty to the Sultan were demanded and extracted. Regaining
the allegiance not only of the warlords but also of the Greek notables, particularly in
Roumeli, was essential for the smooth transition of power and for reducing emigration
from  the  Empire  to  the  Greek  state,  a  threatening  and  easily  observed  sign  of
ill‑administration. However, none of these measures was bound to bring any results as
long as the Albanian mutineers were ravaging the provinces. Beating them down was not
an easy task.35
15 In 1830 Albanian rebels  continued to fish for  allies  on the Greek side but  they were
running out of time and space as both the Greek and the Ottoman camp closed their
ranks.  They were dragged into an intra‑armatoles clash in Agrafa,  albeit  without  any
strategic gains. Aslan Bey managed to recruit a few hundred Greek bandits (listes) led by a
certain Theocharis but to no avail.  Mahmud Hamdi Pasha struck an early blow to the
rebels in April 1830, near Tsaritsani, in a passage between Macedonia and Thessaly. Ragib
and Kaplan,  the brothers of  Aslan Bey Puzzi  were severely beaten‑up.  Hundreds were
killed and wounded. Aslan Bey, then in Lamia, had to manoeuvre through Greek territory
to save himself and his followers. As Thessaly was being cleansed from the Tosk rebels, he
and his new associate Tafil Buzi, once a follower of Omer Vrioni who had sided with the
Greeks,  ravaged  the  town  of  Kozani  in  south‑west  Macedonia.  They  were  forced  to
evacuate it after a month of pillaging. 36
16 The  Chams,  yet  unaware  of  Aslan’s accumulating  troubles,  were  also  on  the  move,
besieging the pro‑Sultan guards all around Epirus. Ziliftar Poda was on their side and
Mustafa Pasha  of  Skodra  was  still  expected  to  put  his  weight  and  overwhelm  the
Ottomans. But the Chams were frustrated (or perhaps relieved) in the most unexpected
way. Veli Bey Yatzi, who had been almost useless to the Grand Vizier so far, managed to
come to terms with Aslan Bey. By that time Kütahı had established his position in Bitola
escorted by units of the newly formed regular army. What followed is not unknown to
historians.  The vizier mustered in that town notable Christians and Muslims alike to
indoctrinate them into his new mode of administration and the Albanian chieftains were
paid their long due salaries. After massaging the Albanian chieftains with pardons and
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bribes for several  days,  on 9 August 1830 he summoned them, supposedly to attend a
ceremonial  salute  parade  of  the  regulars,  and  shot  dead  some  hundreds  of  them,
including Aslan and Veli. Their severed heads were duly salted and sent to Constantinople
for exhibition.  Two days later Emin Bey,  the Vizier’s  son,  ambushed and killed Veli’s
brother inside the fortress of Ioannina. Prudent Poda did not attend the Bitola meeting
and was saved. Aslan’s brother Ragib, then in Ioannina, declined Emin’s invitation and
also escaped slaughter. Mustafa Pasha and his Geghs army had not interfered at all.37
17 The Tosks were puzzled and enraged by Mustafa Busatli’s treason and the Grand Vizier’s
treachery; but they did not despair, at long as Ziliftar Poda was on their side. Their beys
attended meetings, took oaths of revenge, and summoned their forces. They also sought
assistance from the Greek side:  the emigrant Souliots,  the Christians of Himarë, even
from Governor Kapodistrias. They received none. Kapodistrias explained to the two Cham
beys who had written to him that peace with the Ottoman Empire had been restored and
that  its  breach was against  Greek interests.38 Poda did not  renew his  efforts  to save
himself from extinction and his son, then a hostage in the hands of the Vizier,  from
death. The decisive moves of Kütahı during the fall of 1830 discouraged all his opponents.
His pashas moved swiftly and, assisted by the Greek armatoles, began to re-occupy Epirot
towns and fortresses,  and to replace irregular with regular guards.39 In the following
weeks,  as  the forces  of  Mahmud Hamdi  moved to  the Berat  region to  confiscate  the
properties of Aslan and Veli, the flow of the rebel beys and their families to the nearby
island of Corfu escalated.40
18 When he had left Ioannina for Bulgaria eighteen months earlier, Kütahı had promised
with tears in his eyes to take revenge of the mutinous Albanians. He kept his promise. But
this did not suffice to satisfy his master. His return from Bitola to Epirus ought to signal
the restoration of  rule  and justice and he worked intensively to this  end.  Letters  of
amnesty were sent anew around Roumeli, within and outside the Sultan’s domains. He
invited the  people  of  Parga,  who had taken refuge in  Corfu 1817,  to  return to  their
homeland and encouraged pastoralists  from Akarnania (Greek territory)  to  use  their
usual mountain summer pastures in Ottoman held Epirus. For local Christian notables
and  Muslim  beys  he  reserved  a  mixture  of  flatter,  pressure,  threat  and,  mostly,
punishment. This is what he knew best. All those who had made the poor people suffer in
his  absence  would  have  to  pay  dearly.41 Terror  spread  amongst  them.  After  the
Grand Vizier’s return to Ioannina (October 1830), nobody who had taken arms against the
Sultan risked to approach him in person to ask for pardon or to negotiate a compromise;
least of all the unscrupulous armatoles,  who had been flirting with all sides. As winter
approached,  they  were  all  asked  to  reduce  their  forces  to  a  minimum.  They  were
threatened but they did not succumb. In wintertime, armatoles were untouchable.42 The
diplomatic process was also coming to an end. Despite Greek disillusion, Akarnania was
due to be evacuated by the Greek armed forces and handed over to the Porte in exchange
for Athens and Euboea. Details were being arranged as a simultaneous transfer had been
agreed upon.43 The British Consul  in Preveza,  Edward Meyer,  announced that  perfect
calmness had eventually been restored in Epirus after a decade of warfare.44 He could not
have been more wrong.
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Turbulence, violence and insecurity
19 It was only a few days later, on 12/24 December, that the Grand Vizier stunned once more
everyone. After detailed planning, he launched a surprise attack against all the active
armatoles in Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus. Some of them were invited to receive their
orders in person and upon arrival were murdered; others were ambushed at home or
encircled at their hiding places by troops sent against them following a wide strategic
plan in which the cavalry and the navy were also involved. In the following days and
weeks, the initially clandestine operation evolved into a campaign with severe collateral
damages,  from Mt  Pelion  to  Halkidiki  and  to  Agrafa.  In  the  latter,  Ottoman  forces,
supported by a strong local militia recruited by a local Greek notable, swept the armatoles
out of the region. Hundreds were killed during these mid‑winter operations but only a
few captains,  most  likely  less  than ten.  Some of  them,  like  the  armatole captains  of
southern Macedonia, managed to escape thanks to the speedy mediation of the Russian
and the French Consuls in Salonica to the Grand Vizier and the hefty purse delivered to
the local pasha.45
20 Not unlike what had happened in Bitola, the attack was directed against all the armatoles,
regardless  of  their  actual  stance during the previous months.  Petitions against  them
signed by village notables had been extracted and collected in advance. Kapodistrias had
been briefed by the Grand Vizier on the sufferings caused by brigandage and had agreed
to refuse them entry to Greece when pursued by the Ottoman army. When the powers
protested for the unnecessary bloodshed, the Porte presented sufficient documents to
prove that it was for a good cause and with Greek approval, from top to bottom.46 The
trick  was  that  the  armatoles in  the  service  of  Porte  were  deliberately  confused with
thieves, robbers and brigands; they were called listes (ληστές), a pejorative term employed
instead of the well‑know term kleft, a synonym of freedom fighter. Even if they deserved
this confusion, still, for the time being, most armatoles were in reasonable if not in good
terms with the Ottoman administration.
21 In the following months, as a wider Albanian revolt broke out, it was thought that the
December attack  against  the  armatoles was  a  pre‑emptive  strike  to  undermine  the
Albanian  morale  and  cut  short  their  Christian  reserves.  This  is  not  a  plausible
explanation.  Had  the  Vizier  foreseen  or  known  the  forthcoming  open  revolt  of
Mustafa Busatli Pasha, he would have strengthened instead of breaking his ties with the
Greek captains so as to secure his back.  It  is more likely that Kütahı  considered this
operation as  the final  stage of  a  mission assigned to him by the Sultan to  clear  his
domains  from all  the  armed irregulars,  Christian and Muslim alike,  and to  secure  a
“monopoly of violence” for the Porte. At least this is how he had explained his actions in
a letter to the French and Russian Consuls.47
22 Whether in the service of the Porte or not, the captains of the armatoles attracted around
them irregulars and outlaws of all kinds; therefore, they contributed a lot to the state of
anomaly, which Kapodistrias had exposed as a serious deficit of Ottoman administration
and  used  as  an  argument  against  the  annexation  of  Akarnania.  In  his  view,  local
turbulence and insecurity were signs that the Porte did not possess the moral right to
rule. Diplomacy was pressing the Ottomans in an additional way. Lord Palmerstone had
already informed Kapodistrias that the fourth Protocol might be revised in favour of
Greece and had advised him to postpone the evacuation of Akarnania.48 The Grand Vizier
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had to move fast in order to eliminate any possible gap that Kapodistrias might exploit.
Yet, he had failed to accomplish his task. Most of the captains were at large.
23 Kütahı’s new act  of  dishonesty  unleashed the rage of  the  surviving Greek irregulars,
armatoles and  bandit  thieves  alike.  As  snow  on  the  mountains  began  to  melt,  in
early spring 1831, they came out of their hideouts and mustered anew, ready to extract
revenge and per  chance,  after  an honourable  compromise,  get  their  armatoliks back.
Surviving captains  were  joined by  the  followers  of  the  deceased and by many more
common thieves from the Greek territory who foresaw a unique opportunity to plunder
and pillage. Unpaid deserters from the Greek battalions, unemployed Souliot worriers,
and young pastoralists merged with them; thus, by late spring, their marauding bands
counted thousands of men.49
24 This flow of men cannot be explained unless certain events are taken into account. From
the early  months  of 1831,  it  was  rumoured that  Busatli Pasha would launch his  long
expected attack against the Grand Vizier. Ziliftar Poda, having freed his hostage son, was
also expected to participate. Both leaders were in contact with the Cham refugees in the
Ionian Islands and in Missologhi and had sent envoys to Greece, even inside the military
camps, to recruit warriors. The Albanians and their allies were definitely supported both
in theory and in  practice  by  the  circle  of  the  discontent  captains  in  Akarnania,  the
aforementioned opponents of Kapodistrias, who wished to renew the revolution and push
Greek frontiers to the north against the provision of the last protocol. This is why the
Greek  brigand  forces  carried  banners  with  the  cross  and  portrayed  themselves  as
liberators who had been pursued by their own government and forced to seek a better
fortune in the Sultan’s domains. In fact, in May 1831 an army mutiny broke out against
Kapodistrias. He managed, however, to preserve the control of all the battalions, while
the mutineers merged with the brigands. However, enthusiasm was still running high as
news were coming announcing the sacking of numerous Ottoman towns and villages and,
most of all, the eventual involvement of Busatli and Poda. Christian brigands joined their
forces with Albanian rebels and became even more daring.50
25 Yet,  despite  the  initial  enthusiasm,  the  timing  was  far  from  perfect  for  the  rebels.
Mustafa Pasha had been preparing his come back, at least since January 1831. He had
tried to secure support of every kind from Serbia, Egypt and Bosnia, mostly from the
Bosnians, who shared his detest for the nizam.51 Open warfare, however, began in the end
of March when he moved to the south and occupied Skopje. Among his allies were also
some Albanian ayans of Macedonia ‑one of them, Ali Bey Karafejzić of Tetovo, plundered
the bazaars of Sofia‑ and the expatriate Peloponnesian Tosks of Lala. The Grand Vizier
rushed to Bitola while major towns in Thessaly and Southern Macedonia were falling easy
prey to the rebels. The odds were against him but he defeated Busatli and his Geghs twice
in less than two weeks. Mustafa fled to Skoutari.52 By that time, Poda had hardly moved
his forces. He was checked and then besieged in his castle by Mahmud Hamdi Pasha of
Larissa. The northern front had not been cleared yet ‑ the Bosnians were coming and
Busatli Pasha was still active. Yet in May the Grand Vizier was in a position to mobilise
under  the  threat  of  severe  punishment  his  old  associates  in  Ioannina and put  them
urgently against the Greek‑Albanian brigands, still unaffected by the course of warfare in
the north. It was not an easy task, yet it was accomplished before the July revival of Cham
revolutionary  activities  in  Epirus,  the  Bosnian  victorious  offensive  and  the  surprise
exodus of Busatli’s besieged forces in Skoutari. By the end of June 1831, the main force of
the  Greek  and  Albanian  brigands  had  been  defeated  and  broken  into  small  bands,
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vexatious but unable to pose a serious threat. Tafil Buzi and Aliko Liamtze, an uncle of the
late  Aslan Bey Puzi,  were  leading the  strongest  of  them but  proved unable  to  break
through and assist the besieged Poda. Apparently, the rebel forces and their allies were
hardly coordinated.53
26 As far as the Greek brigands were concerned, lack of coordination was only one of their
problems. Of greater importance was the growing lack of support from the local Christian
population.  Christian villagers within the Sultan’s domains were unwilling to see the
brigands’  power restored. They could no longer afford supporting them. At the same
time, on the Greek side of the border their recent burst for revolutionary glory could not
erase  the  stigma  of  Turcophilia.  They  had  been  deprived  of  state  recognition  and
protection  both  in  Greece  and  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Without  Greek  or  Ottoman
commission, they were not different from common outlaws on both sides of the border.54
This view was shared by both the Grand Vizier and the Greek Governor as mentioned
above. The cooperation of the two leaders for the annihilation of brigandage, though not
really desirable, was inescapable. The Ottoman Empire and nascent Greece had to act like
modern states in spite of recent bitter memories. By the time (June 1831) the brigands
were defeated by the pashas who were sent after them, some progress had been made to
restrict their movement, albeit it was not impressive. Their annihilation could not be
realised as long as Greece would let them cross the border and seek refuge.
 
“Robbery” and negociations
27 Kütahı  and his son Emin had begun to exercise considerable pressure on Kapodistrias
soon  after  the  initial  attack  against  the  armatole captains  in  December 1830.  The
governor’s assertion that robbery (listeia/ληστεία) was evil and had to be checked was
taken as an official commitment to support Ottoman endeavours and his later promise to
seek  out  any  intruding  outlaws  and  force  them out  of  Greece  was  interpreted  as  a
guarantee for a relentless pursue. Yet soon, Emin Pasha was able to produce ample and
detailed evidence that the governor could not keep his promise and conform to Ottoman
expectations, although Ottoman aims were in line, in Emin’s view, with international law.
55
28 Ottoman allegations were employed by Kapodistrias to strengthen his case. He admitted
bluntly his inability to control the border. He had tried hard and had documents to prove
his willingness but he had limited resources. War and anarchy on the other side of the
border, he argued, appealed to men who had warfare as their profession and weapons as
their tools of trade. He suggested a rearrangement of the frontier line so that it would
become defensible and controllable from the Greek side or else the hunting down of the
brigands should be assigned to French troops. Both Kütahi and Kapodistrias were aware
that in essence their correspondence and arguments on brigandage were linked to the
larger  and pending debate  about  the  future  frontier  line.  In  this  context,  they  both
wanted to make clear that they were able to govern effectively their domains.  Their
shortcomings, therefore, were attributed mostly to each other. Yet, Kapodistrias knew
that his arguments, no matter how suitable they were for the Europeans, were not going
to save his country in case the Grand Vizier, in his anger and despair, ordered an invasion
of  Greece  to  hunt  down  the  brigands.  This  was  his  constant  and  not  entirely
unsubstantiated  concern.  In May 1831  Kütahi  asked  him to  urgently  choose  between
stopping the brigands’ entry or allowing the Ottoman army to chase them inside Greece.
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His letter was also communicated to the European courts. In a final attempt to buy time,
Kapodistrias proposed sending a mixed committee to negotiate with the Grand Vizier in
Bitola. This was the civilised way to handle the issue.56
29 The mission was assigned to Senator Ioannis Karapavlos, a close political friend of the
governor,  a  notable  of  Koroni,  who  was  escorted  by  the Russian Consul
Ioannis Paparrigopoulos  and  the  British Consul  General  William Meyer,  an  old
acquaintance of the Grand Vizier since 1828. The Greek proposal consisted of three terms:
• All possible efforts would be made to stop the entry of brigands and rebels and to keep the
intruders away from the border zone,
• Brigands’ families would be relocated to Peloponnese or to the islands or else they would
have to leave Greece,
• To the extent that the spoils of looting could be distinguished from legal merchandise, such
spoils  could  not  be  traded inside  Greece.57 The party  moved from Nafplio  to  Ochrid  via
Missolonghi,  Prevesa and Ioannina but  when they arrived,  three weeks later,  the Grand
Vizier was not there. He had departed on the eve of their arrival to face the Bosnian attack
threatening Skopje.
30 In his stead Hati effendi, special envoy of the Porte, carried on the negotiation for two
weeks. They reached a standstill when it became clear that the terms under discussion
were not the same as those submitted by Kapodistrias to the European ambassadors in
Constantinople. The latter had provided for the arrest and deportation of all those who
would seek refuge in Greece. The return of the defeated and angry Kütahi two weeks later
did not  facilitate  the  negotiations.  He would not  accept  anything less  than the firm
closure of the border, the arrest and deportation of the runaway rebels and robbers and
the payment of indemnities by the perpetrators for damages caused. Even the entry of
the Ottoman army into Greece as an ultimate measure was still on the table, though not
submitted in writing. The mission of Karapavlos turned out to be impossible.58
31 As soon as the envoys reported what had been discussed at Bitola and the new terms of
the  Grand Vizier  were  announced,  Kapodistrias began  preparing  a  feasible
counter‑proposal, which he communicated to the Powers. He made clear to his political
commissioners and to his officers that if they did not follow his instructions to watch
closely over the intruders and deport them the “most essential interests of the state”
would be endangered.59 The negotiations had been a failure by all accounts save one. The
Greek Governor had bought some precious time when it was much needed. In late July,
when  Karapavlos  was  debating  with  Hati effendi  in  Bitola,  the  improvement  of  the
frontier in favour of Greece was finally decided in London, that is the restoration of the
Adrianople line (Amvrakikos to Pagasitikos). Instructions were dispatched from London
to Constantinople in late September. Most likely Kapodistrias was unaware of the details
when he completed his counter proposal. It was only five days before his assassination. By
that  time,  both  Ziliftar Poda  and  the  Cham beys  of  Epirus  had  been  beaten  up  and
capitulated to save their heads.60 Three weeks later Busatli Pasha also succumbed. A bomb
had blown up his gun powder store, in his mighty fortress. He was also pardoned on
conditions.
32 The fall of the Busatli house was not the end of the Porte’s Balkan troubles. The Bosnian
uprising  continued  into 1832  and  fresh  Albanian  uprisings  took  place  between 1833
and 1836,  Tafil Buzi always playing the leading part.61 Illegal border crossings did not
cease either and gradually became a permanent feature in Greek‑Ottoman relations and a
prerequisite of state sponsored irredentism. Soon after the assassination of Kapodistrias,
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Greece  was  dragged  into  another  round  of  civil  strife  between  the  adherents  of  a
Constitution, with pro‑French and British leanings, and the pro‑Russians, the followers of
the Kapodistrias family and Kolokotronis.  Needless to say,  Kolettis and his Roumeliot
armatole clients constituted the hard core of  the former party.  In this chaotic period
(autumn 1831‑winter 1831‑32), numerous brigands easily crossed the frontier and some of
their captains, Buzi included, were recruited as army officers by the opposition.62 The
Grand Vizier kept a low profile until he had to depart for Syria (spring 1832) to tackle the
Egyptian  invasion,  coming  too  late  to  influence  Albanian  affairs.  He  watched  the
capitulated Albanian chieftains, especially Poda, who had sought shelter in Greece instead
of going on a pilgrimage to Mecca as he had promised, and in vain protested to the Greek
government; but he did not dare to intervene, as Kapodistrias had feared.63 As a serasker
of the old regime, most likely he wished to crash these brigand captains who were getting
in his way for a decade or so and accomplish the task once assigned to him by his Sultan.
As  a  Grand Vizier,  he  knew  that  the  days  of  brutal  suppression  were  gone.  The
independence of Greece under King Otto was decided on 29 April/11 May 1832 and the
remaining details of the frontier line four months later. All the Ottoman Empire could do
was to behave and to reform.
33 Although  the  problem of  brigandage  was  not  of  the  same  scale  for  Greece  and  the
Ottoman  Empire,  considering  the  general  dislike  of  nizam in  the  Balkans  and  the
extensive  fighting  to  impose  the  will  of  the  Sultan,  both Governor  Kapodistrias  and
Grand Vizier Mehmed Reşid did their best to solve it in a European like manner through
diplomatic means. What was at stake was not merely to bring to end brigandage and deal
effectively with beys and chieftains, Muslim or Christian, Albanian or Greek. Who would
control  the  new  borderland,  a  by‑product  of  the  Greek  Revolution,  was  of  outmost
importance  in  the  minds  of  both  sides.  New frontiers  went  hand‑in‑hand  with  new
borderlands; a borderland between a new state, tormented by domestic political strives,
Hellas,  a  crumpling  Ottoman Empire,  trying  to  pull  itself  together,  and an  Albanian
indirect yet violent claim for some kind of territoriality. As diplomacy protracted, a much
larger  area  acquired the  characteristics  of  a  borderland,  since  none  of  the  three
interested  parties  could  impose  its  control.  Its  size  was  unspecified,  Sterea  Hellas,
Thessaly, Epirus, South and North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia.
 
Albanians at the heart of the problem
34 Albanians were at the heart of the problem. Vague signs of nationalism could be traced in
the plans, letters and sayings of some of their leaders, Geghs or Tosks, but it is hard to
argue that as a whole they were pursuing a national project. On the contrary, their beys
and clan leaders were bound with bonds of blood and divided by vendettas. The number
of their paid followers determined the social hierarchy of these networks. Leadership
depended on the size of the purse. Thus, as stated above, their common and most serious
concern was to keep alive the mercenary system, not to build a state. Their care for the
preservation of the Islamic or any other local tradition reflected nothing more than this
major financial concern. Tosks and Geghs sided with or against the Grand Vizier, with or
against each other depending on the flow or the promise of salaries. If the Porte paid
them, it could easily regain their loyalty. If not, they could –and they did– side with the
Greeks  without  any religious  reservation;  yet  this  choice  was  tactical,  an emergency
solution for the rebels, not a sign of national convergence; unless the Albanian speaking
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Greeks (the Souliots included) were willing to renounce their recently acquired Greek
veneer and turn Albanian.
35 In order to escape the stigma of Islam Tafil Buzi, who invested heavily on the Greek camp,
identified himself as an Epirot, a descendent of the ancient King Pyrrhus and the early
modern Christian Albanian warlord Skanderbeg.64 For other Albanian beys of his rank
such arguments were redundant. Usually they tried to exploit old bonds of friendship,
trust, alliance or the handy memory of Ali Pasha; a cause that did not necessarily reflect a
real past but was socially acceptable. In any case, in the absence of regular payment,
Albanian rebels were not in need of an alternative state mechanism. Looting and taxing
freely an increasingly extensive region, from Prevesa and Trikala to Sofia and Skopje,
especially the urban centres, made up for the loss of salaries.
36 Next to and in contact with the Albanian rebels was the world of the Greek palikaria, the
klefts or listes, the armatoles and their captains (kapetanioi), also dressed in their once white
kilts and no less unwilling to replace them with any kind of European uniform. In this
world, as stated above, flexibility was also a virtue necessary to survive, in addition to
networks  of  power  connecting  chieftains,  followers,  political  patrons,  friends,  and
relatives. After ten years of warfare a surplus of armed palikaria had been created; young
professional  warriors,  mostly  Roumeliots,  Epirots  and Macedonians,  unable  to  secure
their living in peacetime. The light Greek battalions were an option after 1829 but there
was not enough room for hundreds of them or good prospects for regular remuneration.
The same was true for their angry captains in search of high offices, which could prolong
the irregular taxation of their respective provinces and the payment of their soldiers. Did
they have a better option outside Greece? Both the Ottoman army and the Albanian rebels
of Poda appeared willing to compensate them for their support. They could exploit the
situation to regain their offices or even extract better terms of employment playing one
employer against the other.  If  the Ottomans eventually re‑gained Roumeli,  then they
would top the social hierarchy, being the ablest and most suitable to rule the Greeks
anew. Flirting with the Albanians was indeed dangerous; but at least they could seek
refuge for themselves and their  families  as  well  as markets  for  the booty in Greece,
behind the frontier line.
37 The December attack of Mehmed Reşid against friends and foes alike definitely changed
the priorities  of  those who survived.  The armatole career  had seemingly  come to an
official end, but they had not run out of options, especially when Bushatli and Poda got
actively involved. In this context, Greek brigands, jointly with the Albanians, could loot
extensively  Muslims  and  Christians  alike.  At  the  same  time  they  could  claim  they
participated  in  a  revolutionary  action  to  force  the  revision  of  the  onerous  fourth
protocol, in a protest against the compromising policy of Kapodistrias and in favour of a
constitutional  government.  Thus,  they  portrayed  themselves  as  ardent  nationalists
deserving official pardon and restitution, as the impoverished victims of the governor’s
domestic policy and active members of his opposition, ready to take over the government
of Greece. Their choice was justified after the Kapodistrias’ assassination and even more
so during the following decades, as the deeds of the klefts and the armatoles were purified
and cherished in the context of Greek irredentism.
38 Keeping under control and pacifying this turbulent border zone, the habitat of Greek and
Albanian  military  élite,  was  a  complicated  task.  Neither  the  Grand Vizier  nor  the
Greek Governor had the necessary capital to buy out the brigand chiefs. For both sides
forced conscription to  the regular  army was  the  only  remedy for  disorder  but  local
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recruits could not be trusted, having served for a long time as irregulars. Unlike Greece,
which depended exclusively on locals recruits, the Empire had the option to move Asiatic
troops to the Balkans. But trained reserves were in short supply considering the pressing
strategic needs at the time and the novelty of the new model army. As a result, Ottoman
regular forces were always outnumbered by Albanian rebels, and irregulars were badly
needed to tip the balance of power. Control was not only a matter of military power but
also of trust. But trust of the state was in short supply across both sides of the border
since the future of those regions had not been decided yet. Kütahı and Kapodistrias relied
on a number of trusted military officers, supported by special envoys and administrators
(mütesellims in the Ottoman case), to administer taxation and oversee the loyalty of the
rest. They also spent considerable effort to massage the notables and the clergy with
promises of law and order in order to break loose from the captains’ tight control. In this
task, the Grand Vizier proved more efficient than the Greek Governor. It was not only a
matter of experience. Although his policy was closely monitored by the European powers,
he could still employ mass violence and treachery to subdue his opponents as long as he
could prove that this was his only option and a prerequisite for the new order.
39 The efforts to control the borderland would have been more effective if a definite frontier
line  had  been  decided.  Yet,  even  in  its  absence,  a  sense  of  territoriality  had  been
developed to the benefit of both the states and the outlaws. The former had to converge
over  the  border  in  order  to  secure  trade,  the  movement  of  transhumant  shepherds,
passport  control,  quarantine,  and  most  of  all  security.  These  could  not  be  achieved
without physical  contact between the Ottoman pashas and the Greek majors,  without
direct or indirect communication between the Governor and the Grand Vizier. Outlaws
had also benefited. Ravaging outside the line under the appropriate banner was not an
evil act but a manifestation of Greek patriotism. Inside the line, as mentioned above,
there was always a safe place for brigands, thieves, rebels and mutineers and chances to
trade the spoils  of  plunder,  mostly  sheep and goats.  Sometimes outlaws were dined,
inebriated, and bribed by Greek officers to stay outside Greece and thus negate Ottoman
allegations of offering them asylum. This set up involved even virtual skirmishes.  On
other  occasions  Greek officers  extracted money and treats  from the Muslim beys  to
secure safe pastures for their sheep inside Greece. Most likely, these were not the only
occasions to extract bribes and they did not cease when the line was fixed.
 
Conclusion
40 To conclude,  Greek independence and the end of warfare after the conclusion of the
Russo‑Turkish war affected in multiple ways the armed Greek and Albanian elites of the
region.  Territorial  demarcation,  the attempted restoration or building (in the case of
Greece)  of  central  control  in order to monopolise  violence,  peace on non acceptable
terms, and military modernisation went clearly against their traditional interests. Their
world seemed to have come to an end. Their responses turned violent in direct ratio to
the threat of extinction they encountered. But this did not imply that they were not
willing to compromise. Turning brigand or rebel, as the case might be, were standard
practices that facilitated a successful new agreement of terms. No doubt, this attitude was
in the mind of everybody from top to bottom, from Mustafa Pasha of Skodra to the last
Greek palikari. They did not want to break bad, but to regain their status, influence, and
welfare. Only this time the scale was different. Generalised mutiny inside Greece and the
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Empire  was  undesirable  for  the  Powers.  This  was  clear  to  Kapodistrias  and  to  the
Grand Vizier. They both proved extremely willing to sacrifice the old élite of captains and
beys  for  the  needs  of  current  diplomacy  unless  they  succumbed  and  obeyed.  In  an
unexpected way, however, the violent reaction of these agents of tradition, regardless of
their true motives and slogans, fed back both Albanian nascent nationalism and Greek
irredentism and tormented diplomacy for ages. Revenge is a dish always served cold.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
Monographies
ALIČIČ Ahmed S., 1996, Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 godina [Mouvement pour
l’autonomie de la Bosnie en 1831‑1832], Orijentalni institut, Sarajevo, 438 p.
ANSCOMBE Frederick F., 2014, State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post‑Ottoman Lands, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 339 p.
ARAVANDINOS Petros Pargeios [ΑΡΑΒΑΝΤΙΝΌΣ Πέτρος Πάργειος], 1856, Χρονογραφία της Ηπείρου
[Chronique de l’Épire] Σ.Κ. Βλαστός [S.K. Vlastos], Αθήνα [Athènes], reprint 1969, vol. 1, 416 p.
BLADAS Giorgos [ΒΛΆΝΤΑς Γιώργος], 2014, «Ο Σωτ. Στρατός δερβεναγάς του Δομοκού, το
μπουγιούρντι του βαλή των Τρικάλων 1830, παράπονα των Αγραφιωτών εναντίον του»
[Sotiris Stratos, dervenagas de Domokos, le bouyourdi du vali de Trikala, 1830, plaintes des
Agrafiotes contre lui] Θεσσαλικό ημερολόγιο [Chronique thessalienne], n°66, p. 25‑9.
DONTAS Domna N. [ΔΌΝΤΑΣ Δόμνα], 1966, The Last Phase of the War of Independence in Western Greece
(December 1827 to May 1929), Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, pp. 17‑85.
ERDEM Hakan, 2007, “‘Perfidious Albanians’ and ‘Zealous Governors’: Ottomans, Albanians, and
Turks in the Greek War of Independence” in ANASTASOPOULOS Antonis [ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Αντόνης]
& KOLOVOS Elias [ΚΟΛΟΒΌΣ Ηλίας] (eds), Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760‑1850. Conflict,
Transformation, Adaptation. Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Rethymno, Greece,
13‑14 December 2003, Πανεπιστήμιο Κρήτης [Université de Crète], Ρέθυμνο [Réthymnon], 264 p.
FANSHAWE TOZER Henry, 1869, Researches in the Highlands of Turkey, John Murray, London, vol. 1.
KAMBEROVIĆ Husnija, 2002, Husein‑kapetan Gradaščević (1802‑1834) Biografija [Husein‑kapetan
Gradascevic (1802‑1834), biographie], BZK Preporod, Gradačac, 128 p.
KASOMOULIS Nikos [ΚΑΣΟΜΟΎΛΗΣ Νίκος], 1970, Απομνημονεύματα της επαναστάσεως των Ελλήνων
[Mémoires de la révolution des Grecs], Κοσμαδάκης [Kosmadakis], Αθήνα [Athènes] vol. 3, 1830 p.
KOKKINOS Dionysios [ΚΌΚΚΙΝΟΣ Διονύσος], 1960, Η ελληνική επανάσταση, [La Révolution grecque],
Μέλισσα [Melissa], Αθήνα [Athènes], vol. 12.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
17
KOUTSONIKAS Lambros [ΚΟΥΤΣΟΝΊΚΑΣ Λάμπρος], 1863, Γενική Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως
[Histoire générale de la Révolution grecque], Ευαγγελισμός [Evangelismos], Αθήνα [Athènes],
vol. 1, 278 p.
LEAR Edward, 1851, Journals of a Landscape Painter in Albania, Richard Bentley, London.
LOUKOS Christos [ΛΟΎΚΟΣ Χρίστος], 1988, Η αντιπολίτευση του Κυβερνήτη Ιω. Καποδίστρια 1828‑1831
[L’opposition au Gouverneur Ioannis Capodistria, 1828‑1831], Θεμέλιο [Themelio], Αθήνα
[Athènes], 452 p.
MERDJANOVA Ina, 2013, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and
Transnationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
NACI Stavri, 1986, Pashalleku i Shkodres 1796‑1831 [Patriarcat de Shkodra, 1796‑1831], Akad. e
Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, Tiranë.
NEDELJKOVIĆ Slaviša, 2015, “Between the Imperial Government and Rebels. Old Serbia during the
Rebellion of the Shkodra Pasha Mustafa Bushati and the Bosnian Aristocracy 1830‑1832”, 
Istraživanja, 26 (2015), p. 92‑3.
PAPADOPOULOS Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΔΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Στέφανος], 1962, Η επανάσταση στη Δυτική Στερέα Ελλάδα 
μετά την πτώση του Μεσολογγιού ως την οριστική απελευθέρωσή της 1826‑1832 [La révolution en Grèce
continentale de l’ouest de la chute de Missolonghi jusqu’à sa libération finale 1826‑1832]
Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο [université Aristote] Θεσσαλονίκη [Thessalonique], 240 p.
PAPADOPOULOS Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΔΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Στέφανος], 1964, «Η οργάνωση του στρατού της Δυτικής
Στερέας Ελλάδας επί Καποδίστρια» [L’organisation de l’armée de la Grèce continentale de l’ouest
sous Capodistria], Ελληνικά, 18 [Grecques], p. 144‑169.
PAPADOPOULOS Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΔΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Στέφανος], 1986, Η στρατιωτική πολιτική του Καποδίστρια, 
δομή, οργάνωση και λειτουργία του στρατού ξηράς της καποδιστριακής περιόδου [La politique militaire
de Capodistria, organisation et fonctionnement de l’armée de terre de la période capodistrienne],
Εστία [Hestia], Αθήνα [Athènes].
PAPAGEORGIOU Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΓΕΩΡΓΊΟΥ Στέφανος], 2014, “The Attitude of the Beys of the Albanian
Southern Provinces (Toskaria) towards Ali Pasha Tepedelenli and the Sublime Porte (mid‑18th
‑mid‑19th Centuries) The Case of ‘der ’e madhe’ [Great House] of the Beys of Valona”, Cahiers
balkaniques, 42 (2014), pp. 2‑29.
PAPAGEORGIOU Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΓΕΩΡΓΊΟΥ Στέφανος], 2005, Aπό το γένος στο έθνος. Η θεμελίωση του
Ελληνικού κράτους 1821‑1862 [Du génos à la nation. La fondation de l’État grec 1821‑1862],
Παπαζήσης [Papazisis] Αθήνα [Athènes].
PAPAGEORGIOU Stephanos, 1985, “The Army as an Instrument for Territorial Expansion and for
Repression by the State: The Capodistrian Case”, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora 12.4, p. 33 sqq.
PAPAGEORGIOU Stefanos [ΠΑΠΑΓΕΩΡΓΊΟΥ Στέφανος] (ed.), 1992, Το αρχείο Γιαννάλη Ραγού [Les archives
de Giannalis Ragou], IEEE, Αθήνα [Athènes].
PAPAGIORGIS Kostis [ΠΑΠΑΓΙΏΡΓΗΣ Κώστης], 2003, Τα καπάκια, Βαρνακιώτης, Καραϊσκάκης, Ανδρούτσος
[Les kapakia, Varnakiotis, Karaïskakis, Androutsos], Καστανιώτης [Kastaniotis], Αθήνα [Athènes],
290 p.
PHILIMON Ioannis [ΦΙΛΉΜΩΝ Ιωάννης], 1861, Δοκίμιον ιστορικόν περί της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως
[Essai historique sur la Révolution grecque]: Μοραϊτινης [Moraïtinis], Αθήνα [Athènes], vol. 4.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
18
PIZANIAS Petros [ΠΙΖΑΝΊΑΣ Πέτρος], 2014, Ιστορία των Ελλήνων από το 1400 έως το 1820 [Histoire des
Grecs depuis 1400 jusqu’en 1820], Εστία [Hestia], Αθήνα [Athènes], 556 p.
POLLO Stefanaq, 1984, Historia e Shqipërisë: Vitet 30 të shek. XIX‑1912 [Histoire de l’Albanie des
années 30 du XIXe siècle à 1912, Akademia e Shkencave e Rps te Shqiperise, Tiranë.
SEL TURHAN Fatma, 2014, The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising: Janissaries, Modernisation and
Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century, I.B.Tauris, London, 336 p.
SARRIS Neoklis [ΣΆΡΡΗΣ Νεοκλής], 1993, Προεπαναστατική Ελλάδα και οσμανικό κράτος, Από το
χειρόγραφο του Σουλεϊμάν Πενάχ Εφέντη του Μοραϊτη [La Grèce d’avant la révolution et l’État
ottoman, d’après le manuscrit de Suleyman Penach Efendi le moraïte, 1785] Ηρόδοτος
[Herodotos], Θεσσαλονίκη [Thessalonique], 510 p.
SPILIADIS Nikolaos [ΣΠΙΛΙΆΔΗΣ Νικόλαος], 2007, Απομνημονεύνατα ήτοι ιστορία της επαναστάσεως των
Ελλήνων [Mémoires c’est‑à‑dire histoire de la révolution des Grecs], CHRISTOPOULOS Panagiotis F. [
ΧΡΙΣΤΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ ΠΑΝΑΓΙΏΤΗΣ] (ed.), Ινστιτούτο Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης [Institut Charilaos Tricoups],
Αθήνα [Athènes], vol. 4, 3142 p.
SPYROMILIOS Miltos [ΣΠΥΡΌΜΗΛΙΟΣ Μίλτος], 1965, «Ελλάς και Αλβανία. Ο Γιολέκας» [Grèce et
Albanie : Giolekas], Νέος Κουβαράς 3, p. 145 sqq.
THËNGJILLI Petrika, 1981, Kryengritjet popullore kundërosmane në Shqipëri, 1833‑1839 
[Contre‑insurrections populaires en Albanie, 1833‑1839], Akademia e Shkencave e Rps te
Shqiperise, Tiranë.
TZAKIS Dionysis [ΤΖΆΚΗΣ Διονύσιος], 1997, Αρματολισμός, συγγενικά δίκτυα και εθνικό κράτος, οι 
ορεινές επαρχίες της Άρτας στο πρώτο ημίσι του 19ου αιώνα [Armatolisme, réseaux familiaux et État
national, les régions montagneuses d’Arta dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle], unpublished
PhD diss., Panteion University, Athens.
URQUHART David, 1838, The Spirit of the East, Henry Colburn, London, vol. 1.
VAKALOPOULOS Apostolos [ΒΑΚΑΛΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Απόστολος], 1991‑1992, «Νέες ειδήσεις για τις
επαναστάσεις του 1821‑1829 και του 1854 στη Μακεδονία» [Nouvelles annonces sur les révolutions
de 1821‑1929 et de 1854 en Macédoine], Μακεδονικά, [Macédoniennes], n° 28, p. 5‑17.
VAKALOPOULOS Konstantinos [ΒΑΚΑΛΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ Κωνσταντίνος], 1984, Η περίοδος της αναρχείας
1831‑1833, εσωτερικός διχασμός και ξένες επεμβάσεις κατά τη μετακαποδιστριακή περίοδο [La période de
l’anarchie, 1831‑1833, division interne et interventions étrangères pendant la période post
capodistrienne], Επίκεντρο [Epikendro], Θεσσαλονίκη [Thessalonique], 264 p.
VASDRAVELLIS Ioannis K. [Βασδραβέλλης Ιωάννης] (ed.), 1954, Ιστορικά αρχεία Μακεδονίας, Β Αρχείον 
Βέροιας‑Ναούσης 1598‑1886 [Archives historiques de Macédoine, 2, Archives de Veroia‑Naoussa
1598‑1866], Θεσσαλονίκη [Thessalonique].
 
Documents d’archives
Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Greece (hereafter DHAMA)
Files 1831/65/1.6, 1831/4/1.4, 1832/4/1.7,
General State Archives/Kerkyra Prefecture, Ioannis Kapodistrias Papers (hereafter GSA/KP/ICP)
Files 217, 225, 288, 290, 568
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
19
General State Archives/Archive of the General Secretariat (hereafter GSA/AGG),
Files 18, 19, 258b.
MEI
PREVELAKIS Eleftherios [ΠΡΕΒΕΛΆΚΗΣ Ελευθέριος] & GLYTSIS Philippos [ΓΛΥΤΣΉΣ Φίλιππος] (eds),
1975, Μνημεία της ελληνικής ιστορίας, επιτομή εγγράφων του βρετανικού υπουργείου των Εξωτερικών 
[Monuments de l’histoire grecque, recueil de manuscrits du ministère britannique des Affaires
étrangères (hereafter ΜΕΙ), Αθήνα [Athènes], Εκδόσεις Κέντρου Ερεύνης της Ιστορίας του Νεωτέρου
Ελληνισμού. Here vol 1.
National Archives U.K., Foreign Office (hereafter FO).
Files 78/193, 78/198, 78/203 and 78/216.
Nederlands, Het Archief National (hereafter NL‑HaNA.)
Legatie Turkije en de Levant, vol. 138.
NOTES
1. ANSCOMBE, 2014, p. 77‑84.
2. The Greek term “Roumeli”, which denoted Sterea Hellas, should not be confused with
the Ottoman term “Rumeli”, which covered all the European Provinces of the Empire.
3. The  reference  is  (a)  to  the  third  London  Protocol  (March 1829)  which  set  the
Amvrakikos‑Pagasitikos (gulfs) line as the northern frontier of Greece, and was endorsed
by the Porte with the Treaty of Adrianople (September 1829), (b) to the fourth Protocol of
London (February 1830) which reduced Greece to the Spercheios‑Acheloos (rivers) line,
and (c) to the fifth Protocol of London (September 1831) which cancelled the provisions of
the fourth protocol. PAPAGEORGIOU, 2005, p. 282‑283.
4. KOKKINOS, 1960, vol. 12, p. 140.
5. U RQUHART,  1838,  vol. 1,  p. 178‑9,  p. 253‑5;  KOUTSONIKAS,  1863, vol. 1,  p. 178‑9;  A
[ravandinos] P[argeios], 1856, vol. 1, p. 384.
6. PAPAGEORGIOU, 2005, p. 253‑5.
7. PHILIMON, 1861, vol. 4, p. 454.
8. KOUTSONIKAS,  1863,  vol. 2,  p. 218 and 220;  LEAR,  1851,  p. 177‑178;  MERDJANOVA,  2013,
p. 37‑41, 149‑50.
9. FO 78/193, Meyer to Adam, Preveza, 19 Apr. 1830, f. 95r.
10. KOKKINOS, 1960, vol. 3, p. 299‑306, vol. 4, p. 78‑91.
11. Ibid. vol. 3, p. 301‑302.
12. ERDEM, 2007, p. 219‑22, 224‑5.
13. SARRIS, 1993, p. 214‑52.
14. ERDEM, 2007, p. 213‑40. PHILIMON, 1861, p. 153‑66, 285‑302. For Kütahı’ see URQUHART,
1838, vol. 2, p. 355‑360.
15. DONTAS, 1966, p. 17‑85.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
20
16. KASOMOULIS, 1970, vol. 3., pp. 97‑102. For an overall account see PAPAGEORGIOU, 2005,
p. 235.
17. See DONTAS, 1966, p. 169, appendix vii (Meyer to Adam, Preveza, 15 Dec. 1828).
18. For Bushatli, see NEDELJKOVIĆ, 2015, p. 92‑3.
19. DONTAS, 1966, p. 124‑125, 169‑171, appendix vii; ERDEM, 2007, p. 230‑3.
20. ERDEM, 2007, p. 226‑9.
21. For Veli Bey Yatzi, see ARAVANDINOS, 1856, p. 386 and URQUHART, 1838, vol. 1, p. 179,
184, 199.
22. ERDEM, 2007, p. 232; DONTAS, 1966, p. 108‑21; PAPADOPOULOS, 1962, p. 55, 97‑118.
23. URQUHART, 1838, vol. 1, p. 179‑180; ARAVANDINOS, 1856, p. 378.
24. For the Vliora family see PAPAGEORGIOU, 2014, p. 2‑29.
25. DONTAS, 1966, p. 15, 44‑5; SPYROMILIOS, 1965, p. 145.
26. ERDEM, 2007, p. 234‑7; DONTAS, 1966, p. 172‑174.
27. National  Archives  U.K.,  Foreign  Office  (hereafter  FO)  78/193,  Meyer  to  Rudsdell,
Preveza,  21 Jan.,  ff. 11r-13v,  27 Jan.  1830,  ff.  15r-18v,  1st Feb.  1830,  ff. 21r‑23v,  14 Feb.,
ff. 30r‑35r,  19 Feb.  1830,  ff. 36r‑38v and to Aberdeen, 2 Feb.,  ff. 7r‑8r and 20 Feb.  1830,
ff. 25r‑28r. The Morning Chronicle, 28 May 1829; The Times, 11 Nov. 1829.
28. For the armatole networks, see TZAKIS, 1997, p. 44‑69; for a broader presentation, P
IZANIAS, 2014, p. 305‑335.
29. For capitulation and compromise between the Porte and the Greek chieftains see P
APAGIORGIS, 2003, passim, and TZAKIS, 1997, p. 205‑38; PAPADOPOULOS, 1962, p. 32‑40, 69‑71,
85; DONTAS, 1966, p. 24‑9.
30. DONTAS, 1966, pp. 45‑48, 108‑121; PAPADOPOULOS, 1962, p. 97‑138.
31. P REVELAKIS & G LYTSIS (eds),  1975, vol. 1a,  p. 236  (no 702);  PAPADOPOULOS,  1962,
p. 149‑53; The Morning Chronicle, 28 May 1830.
32. PAPADOPOULOS, 1964, p. 144‑69; by the same author, 1986.
33. PAPADOPOULOS,1962, p. 162; BLADAS, 2014, p. 25‑29 ; URQUHART,1838, vol. 1, p. 413‑414.
34. VAKALOPOULOS, 1984, p. 76‑7; LOUKOS, 1988, p. 48‑9, 240‑1, 250‑1, 279.
35. P APADOPOULOS,  1962,  p. 154‑5,  204‑7;  ΜΕΙ,  vol. 1a,  p. 273  (no 800),  p. 282‑285
(nos 825‑831).  FO  78/193,  Meyer  to  Adam,  Preveza,  29 March,  f. 76r‑v,  19 Apr.,  f. 98r,
24 May 1830,  f. 113r.  General  State  Archives/Kerkyra  Prefecture,  Ioannis Kapodistrias
Papers  (hereafter  GSA/KP/ICP),  file 225,  letters  by  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Μissolongi,
12/24 May and 17/29 June 1830; file 288, Pisa to Kapodistrias, Vonitsa, 16/28 May 1830,
circular  of  Mehmed  Reşid  to  the  notables  of  Preveza,  Bitola  29 July/10 Aug. 1830;
Veli Yatzi  to  Stathi  [Katsikogianni],  Preveza,  9/21  and  17/29 March 1830  and  to  the
notables of Vonitsa (s.d.).
36. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 225,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  12/24,  17/29 May,
22 May/3 June, 7/19 June, 1/13 July 1830; file 288, Pisa to Kapodistrias, Vonitsa, 16/28 May
and 17/29 June 1830;  FO 78/193,  Meyer  to  Aberdeen,  Preveza,  1 June,  ff. 109r‑11r  and
8 June 1830,  f. 165r;  Meyer  to  Adam,  Preveza,  24 May,  ff. 113r‑114v,  14 June  1830,
ff. 160r‑161r. Nederlands, Het Archief National (hereafter NL‑HaNA.), Legatie Turkije en
de Levant, vol. 138, Carboneri to de Testa, Thessaloniki, 27 May, no 50 and 25 June 1830,
no 52. VASDRAVELLIS (ed.), 1954, p. 304.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
21
37. FO  78/193,  Meyer  to  Adam,  Preveza,  8 July,  ff. 180r‑181v,  17 July,  ff. 188v‑190r,
14 Aug., ff. 205r‑206r, 19 Aug. 1830, f. 219r‑v; to Gordon, Preveza, 9 July, f. 170r‑v, 6 Sept.
1830,  f. 246v.;  to  Aberdeen,  26 July,  f. 185r‑v.,  21 Αug. 1830,  ff. 196v‑200r.  FO 78/190,
Gordon to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 21 Aug. 1830, f. 232v. GSA/KP/ICP, file 225, Rados to
Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  4/16  and  12/24 Aug. 1830;  file 288,  Pisa  to  Kapodistrias,
Vonitsa,  17/29 June 1830;  David URQUHARt,  op. cit.,  vol. 1,  pp. 190‑2,  247‑63,  308‑12;  F
ANSHAWE TOZER,  1869,  vol. 1,  p. 167‑9.  The  Times, 17 Sept. 1830;  A RAVANDINOS,  1836, 
p. 387‑388.
38. FO 78/193, Meyer to Adam, Preveza, 14 Aug.,  f. 208r, 16 Aug.,  f. 213r.  28 Aug. 1830,
f. 219r‑v.  GSA/KP/ICP,  file 225,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  22 Aug./3 Sept.,
26 Aug./7 Sept.,  30 Aug./11 Sept. 1830;  file 217,  17/29 Sept.,  3/15 Nov.,  1/13 Dec. 1830;
file 290, Kapodistrias to Zéénelie and Loulé, Nafplio, 18/30 Oct. 1830.
39. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 217,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  12/24  Aug.  and
17/29 Sept. 1830;  FO 78/193,  Meyer  to  Aberdeen,  Preveza,  24 Sept. 1830,  f. 262r‑v.;  to
Adam, Preveza, 14 Aug., ff. 209v‑10r, 11 Nov. 1830, f. 297r.
40. FO 78/193,  Meyer  to  Aberdeen,  Preveza,  24 Sept. 1830,  f. 262v;  to  Adam,  26 Sept.,
f. 290r,  22 Oct.,  f. 282r‑v,  11 Nov. 1830,  ff. 299r‑300r.  NL‑HaNA.,  Legatie  Turkije  en  de
Levant, vol. 138, Carboneri to de Testa, Thessaloniki, 13 Oct., no 60 and 27 Oct. 1830, no 62.
GSA/KP/ICP, file 217, Rados to Kapodistrias, Missolonghi, 6/18 Oct. and 3/15 Nov. 1830.
41. ARAVANDINOS, 1836, p. 388‑9. GSA/KP/ICP, file 225, Rados to Kapodistrias, Missolonghi,
26 Aug./7 Sept. 1830;  file 217,  4/16 Oct.,  9/21 Nov. 1830;  FO 78/193,  Meyer to Aberdeen,
Preveza, 22 Dec.¿1830, ff. 303v‑309r. For Mehmed Reşid’s dispach to the pastoralists see
General State Archives/Archive of the General Secretariat (hereafter GSA/AGG), file 258b,
Ioannina, 30 Dec. 1830/11 Jan. 1831.
42. FO 78/193, Meyer to Adam, Preveza, 14 Aug. 1830, ff. 209v‑210r, 11 Nov. 1830, f. 297r.
GSA/KP/ICP,  file 225,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  12/24 Aug.,  22 Aug./3 Sept.,
26 Aug./7 Sept. 1830; file 217, 17/29 Sept., 3/15 Nov., 1/13 Dec. 1830.
43. MEI,  vol. 1a,  pp. 215 (no 646),  295‑302 (nos 867‑78),  318‑9 (no 920),  p. 337 (no 978),
p. 339‑40  (nos 987‑8,  990),  p. 347  (no 1007),  p. 349  (no 1012),  p. 364  (no 1058),  p. 365
(no 1060).  GSA/KP/ICP,  file 217,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  10/22 Sept. 1830.
FO 78/193,  Meyer to Aberdeen,  Preveza,  24 Sept. 1830,  f. 263r‑v and Mehmed Reşid to
Meyer, Bitola, 13/26 Sept. 1830, ff. 277r‑278v.
44. FO 78/193, Meyer to Aberdeen, Preveza, 22 Dec. 1830, f. 303r.
45. KASOMOULIS, 1970, p. 345. Γενική Εφημερίς της Ελλάδος [Journal général de Grèce], 3/15
and 10/22 Jan. 1831.  VAKALOPOULOS,  1991‑1992,  p. 5‑9,  13‑17.  Diplomatic  and Historical
Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Greece (hereafter DHAMA), file. 1831/65/1.6,
Moustoxydis  to  Kapodistrias,  Thessaloniki,  16/28 Dec. 1830;  Milaitis  to  Government
Secretary,  Skopelos,  28 Jan./9 Feb.  1831,  no 169;  Dimandis  to  Kapodistrias,  Nafplio,
27 June/9 July 1831.  NL‑HaNA.,  Legatie Turkije en de Levant,  vol. 138,  Carboneri  to de
Testa,  Thessaloniki,  31 Dec. 1830,  no 67;  vol. 285,  25 Jan.,  no 68,  10 Feb.,  no. 69,  28 Feb.,
no 70,  25 March 1831,  no 72.  MEI,  vol. 1a,  p. 464  (αρ.  εγγρ. 1363).  FO 78/203,  Meyer  to
Rudsdell, Preveza, 2 Jan. 1831, f. 16v.; to Palmerston, 24 Jan. 1831, f. 46r.
46. FO  78/198,  Gordon  to  Palmerston,  Constantinople,  26 Feb. 1831,  ff. 93r‑103r.
Kapodistrias’s reply is also available at DHAMA, file 1831/4/1.4, Nafplio, 5/17 Jan. 1831.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
22
47. FO 78/198, Résumé d’une lettre adressée par le Grand Vizir aux Consuls de France et
de Russie, février 1831, ff. 148r‑150v.
48. MEI, vol. 1a, pp. 215‑6 (no 647).
49. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 217,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  27 Dec. 1830/8 Jan. 1831,
9/21 Jan.,  12/24,  15/27,  18/30,  21 Jan./2 Feb.,  26 Jan./7 Feb. 1831.  FO 78/203,  Meyer  to
Adam, Preveza, 30 Jan. 1831, f. 57r; Meyer to Palmerston, Preveza, 9 Feb. 1831, ff. 51r‑52r.
50. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 217,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  27 Dec. 1830/8 Jan.,
9/21 Jan.,  30 March/11 Apr.,  23 Apr./5 May,  28 Apr./10 May,  5/17 May,  29 May/10 June,
5/17 June 1831; Pappastathopoulos to Rodos, Vonitsa, 23 May/4 June 1831; General State
Archives/The  Archive  of  the  Governor  Plenipotentiary  (hereafter  GSA/AGP),  file 18,
Rados to Α. Kapodistrias, Missolonghi, 15/27 March, 2/14 May, 7/19 May 1831; Kastanas to
Α. Kapodistrias,  Karvasaras,  27 March/8 Apr. 1831,  Ligovisti,  15/27 Apr. 1831,  Vonitsa,
30 Apr./12 May,  13/25 May 1831;  Yannakis Yoldasis  to  Α. Kapodistrias,  Karpenisi
23 May/4 June 1831; Tzanoglou to Α. Kapodistrias, Karpenisi, 23 May/4 June 1831, Rangos
to Tzatzios, Chamoryanni, 4/16 June 1831; DHAMA, file 1831/4/1.4, Rados to Kapodistrias,
Missolonghi,  29 May/10 June 1831.  KASOMOULIS,  1970,  p. 366‑82;  SPILIADIS,  2007,  vol. 4,
p. 525; PAPAGEORGIOU, 1985, p. 33.
51. NACI, 1986, p. 171‑173, 177, 183.
52. FO 78/203, Meyer to Palmerston, Preveza, 9 Feb., f. 52r, 24 June 1831, f. 164v; Meyer to
Adam,  Preveza,  23 Apr.,  f. 119v.,  26 Apr. 1831,  f. 122r‑v;  Emin  to  Meyer,  Ioannina,
12/24 Apr.,  f. 126r‑v.,  5 May  1831,  f. 141r‑v.  NL‑HaNA.,  Legatie  Turkije  en  de  Levant,
vol. 285, Carboneri to de Testa, Thessaloniki, 8 May 1831, no. 80 and 9 May 1831, no 81.
Nedeljković, 2015, p. 97‑98.
53. FO 78/203, Meyer to Palmerston, Preveza, 25 May 1831, f. 147r‑v; GSA/AGP, file 18,
« Ειδήσεις  εξ  Ιωαννίνων »  [New  from  Ioannina],  Vonitsa,  3/15 May 1831;  Rados  to
Α. Kapodistrias, 18/30 May 1831; Pappastathopoulos to Α. Kapodistrias, Vonitsa,
23 May/4 June 1831; Yannakis Yoldagis to Α. Kapodistrias, Karpenisi, 23 May/4 June 1831.
GSA/KP/ICP, file 217, Rados to Kapodistrias, Anatoliko, 9/21 May 1831 and Missolonghi,
23 May/4 June 1831; Velis to Rados, Langada, 21 May/2 June 1831.
54. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 217,  Rados  to  Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  27 Dec. 1830/8 Jan. 1831,
9/21, 12/24, 15/27, 18/30 Jan., 2, 7 Feb. 1831. FO 78/203, Meyer to Adam, Preveza, 30 Jan.
1831, f. 57r; to Palmerston, Preveza, 9 Feb. 1831, ff. 51r‑52r.
55. DHAMA, file 1831/4/1.4, Emin to Kapodistrias, Ioannina, 15/27 Apr. 1831.
56. All the correspondence is available at DHAMA, file 1831/4/1.4. See also ΜΕΙ, vol. 1a, p. 
485  (no 1412)  and  pp. 486‑7  (nos 1415‑6).  FO 32/21,  Dawkins  to  Palmerston,  Nafplio,
19 June 1831, ff. 139r‑141r.
57. DHAMA file 1831/4/1.4, Kapodistrias to Karapavlos, Nafplio, 4/16 June 1831.
58. GSA/KP/ICP, file 217, Rados to Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  13/25 June 1831. For the
detailed  reports  submitted  by  to  Palmerston,  Rudsdell  and  Dawkins,  and  all  the
attachments see:  FO 78/203,  Meyer to Palmerston,  Ioannina,  10 July 1831,  ff. 172r‑174r
and  25 Aug. 1831,  ff. 184r‑188r;  to  Rudsdell,  Ioannina,  9 July 1831,  ff. 180r‑182v;  to
Dawkins,  Ioannina  22 Aug. 1831,  ff. 190r‑220r.  See  also  the  reports  by  Karapavlos  to
Kapodistrias, Ioannina, 27 June/9 July 1831 and Nafplio, 29 Aug./10 Sept. 1831) at DHAMA
file 1831/4/1.4.
Blood Brothers in Despair: Greek Brigands, Albanian Rebels and the Greek-Otto...
Cahiers balkaniques, 45 | 2018
23
59. DHAMA/1831/4/1.4,  Kapodistrias  to  Mehmed Reşid,  Nafplio,  22 Sept./4 Oct. 1831,
no 864;  Kapodistrias  to  the  vice‑ambassadors,  Nafplio,  22 Sept./4 Oct. 1831,  no 865;
Kapodistrias  to  Rückmann,  Nafplio,  22 Sept./4 Oct. 1831,  no 867;  Kapodistrias  to  the
commissioners of Eastern and Western Greece, Nafplio, 21 Sept./3 Oct. 1831, no 866.
60. FO  78/203,  Meyer  to  Palmerston,  Ioannina,  25 Aug. 1831  ff. 186v‑187v  and  Arta,
20 Oct. 1831,  ff. 235r‑236v.  GSA/AGP,  file 19,  Rados  to  Α. Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,
1/13 Sept. 1831.
61. SEL TURHAN, 2014, p. 66-9; ALIČIČ, 1996, p. 305‑12; KAMBEROVIĆ, 2002, p. 50‑61; POLLO,
1984, p. 118‑26; THËNGJILLI, 1981.
62. GSA/KP/ICP,  file 568,  Rados  to  Α. Kapodistrias,  Missolonghi,  20 Oct./1 Nov. 1831;  P
APAGEORGIOU (ed.), 1992, p. 647‑8 (no 686) and p. 630 (no 665); KASOMOULIS, 1970, p. 487. P
APAGEORGIOU,  2005,  p. 291‑3;  FO 78/216,  Meyer  to  Palmerston,  Preveza,  21 Jan. 1832,
ff. 6v‑7v.; Γενική εφημερίς της Ελλάδος [Journal général de Grèce], 10/22 Jan. 1832.
63. DHAMA, file 1832/4/1.7, Mehmed Reşid to Koundouriotis, Ypsilantis, Zaimis, camp in
Syria, 13/25 July 1832.
64. Σωτήρ [Sauveur], 19/31 May 1835, p. 90.
ABSTRACTS
In the last stage of the disastrous war for Greek independence (1829‑31), the suggested northern
frontier line changed three times. The uncertain future of the region, the pressure of the central
government to create regular armed forces and to safeguard security along the new border land
brought the local Greek and Albanian military élites,  after ten years of heavy fighting, in an
awkward  position.  Their  options  were  restricted  and  their  welfare  as  mercenaries  was
threatened. The crumbling Empire and the soon‑to‑be Greek nation-state, were unpredictable in
their responses either as allies or as enemies. Their choices of reaction varied, yet their method
was uniform: to bargain tough before compromising, even if the given choice involved mutiny
and extensive civil strife. Their opponents, on the other side, Governor Ioannis Kapodistrias and
Grand Vizier  Mehmed Reşid  had  to  show  in  the  eyes  of  the  Great  Powers  determination
and improvisation, in order to gain the necessary prestige and win back the disputed territories.
Eventually the making of the frontier forced both warlords and politicians to transform their
tactics and reconsider their alliances.
Dans les dernières années de la catastrophique guerre d’indépendance grecque (1829‑1831), la
frontière nord de la Grèce qui fut suggérée, changea trois fois. Le futur incertain de la région, les
pressions du gouvernement central en vue de créer une armée régulière et d’assurer la sécurité
dans les nouvelles régions frontalières mirent les élites grecques et albanaises dans une position
difficile, après dix ans de durs combats. Leurs options étaient réduites et leur prospérité, comme
mercenaires, menacée. Les réactions, que ce soit comme alliés ou comme ennemis, de l’Empire
ottoman déclinant  et  de  l’État  grec  en construction étaient  imprévisibles.  Il  y  avait  diverses
réactions possibles mais leur choix fut le même :  négocier sévèrement leur place avant de se
soumettre,  même  si  cela  supposait  une  révolte  et  des  luttes  civiles.  De  l’autre  côté,  leurs
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adversaires, le gouverneur Ioannis Capodistria et le Grand vizir Mehmed Reşid devaient montrer
aux grandes puissances à la fois leur volonté et leur capacité d’improvisation, pour conserver
leur prestige et  retrouver les  territoires  qu’ils  risquaient  de perdre.  Le tracé d’une frontière
contraignit finalement autant les combattants que les politiques à changer leur tactique et à
revoir leurs alliances.
Κατά  το  τέλος  του  καταστροφικού  πολέμου  της  ελληνικής  ανεξαρτησίας  (1829‑1831),  το
προτεινόμενο  βόρειο  σύνορο  της  Ελλάδας  άλλαξε  τρεις  φορές.  Η  ρευστότητα  για  το  μέλλον  της
περιοχής, οι πιέσεις της  κεντρικής εξουσίας για τη δημιουργία ενός τακτικού στρατού και συνθηκών
ασφάλειας στις νέες παραμεθόριες περιοχές έφεραν την ελληνική και αλβανική ελίτ, μετά από δέκα
χρόνια  σκληρού  πολέμου,  σε  δεινή  θέση.  Οι  επιλογές  του  περιορίζονταν  και  η  ευημερία  τους,  ως
μισθοφόρων  πολεμιστών,  απειλούνταν.  Η  παραπαίουσα  Οθωμανική  Αυτοκρατορία  και  το   υπό
κατασκευήν  ελληνικό  κράτος  ήταν  απρόβλεπτοι  στις  αντιδράσεις  τους   είτε  ως σύμμαχοι  είτε  ως
εχθροί.  Ακολούθησαν  διαφόρους  μεθόδους   αντίδρασης,  αλλά  η  βασική  μέθοδος  ήταν  η  ίδια:  να
διαπραγματευτούν σκληρά τη θέση τους πριν συνθηκολογήσουν, ακόμη κι αν αυτό σήμαινε στάση
και  εμφύλιες  συγκρούσεις.  Οι  αντίπαλοί  τους,  από  την  άλλη   πλευρά,  ο  Κυβερνήτης
Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας  και  ο  Μεγάλος Βεζίρης  Μεχμέτ Ρεσίτ  (Κιουταχής)  έπρεπε  να  επιδείξουν
ενώπιον των Μεγάλων Δυνάμεων  αυτοσχεδιασμό και αποφασιστικότητα, ώστε να διατηρήσουν το
κύρος  τους   και  να  ανακτήσουν  τις  επαρχίες  που  κινδύνευαν  να  χάσουν.  Ο  σχηματισμός  των
συνόρων ανάγκασε τελικά τόσο τους πολεμιστές όσο τους πολιτικούς, να μεταβάλουν τις τακτικές
τους, και να αναθεωρήσουν τις συμμαχίες τους.
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